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It is assumed that the seller and the bidders view the profile of bidders' types as being selected by nature at random, according to the probability measure on . The pair ( , ) specifies the environment. In this framework each institution defines a Bayesian game, and it assumed that bidders play a Nash equilibrium of this game. The seemingly limitless variety of auctions can be reduced to a small manageable class through the application of the "revelation principle." This implies that we can limit discussion to the class of mechanisms where the bidders are asked to reveal their type, the mechanism determines the probability of selling to each bidder and the price paid, and the mechanism provides no incentives to lie, provided the other bidders are truthful.
Following Maskin and Riley (1984) , Matthews (1984) , and Border (1991) , we formally define an auction to be an ordered list of functions = (p\, ? ?, Pn)> p? : -> [0, 1], / = 1,..., N, satisfying the feasibility condition
0<
(f)
/=i for each t e T. Here p?(t) is the probability that bidder / wins the auction in profile t. The feasibility condition f is just that the probability of selling the object cannot exceed unity. It may be less than unity if there are circumstances under which the seller keeps the object. Note that we have left the payments out of the definition. It is well known that given the probability functions p, the payments can be inferred from the self-selection constraints that it is an equilibrium for each bidder to truthfully reveal his type. From bidder /'s point of view, what is important to him about the auction is the conditional probability that he wins given his type. To facilitate the discus sion of these probabilities, we write ( ) instead of ({ })* and define as usual T~l =Y\ j.j^j Tj, and write t~l for a typical element of T~l. We also write t e as (*/, t~l) T? and more generally ( , t~l) is the tuple t with t? = and/j = tj1 for j /.Let * denote the marginal probability on T] and ,?( ~' | ) denote the conditional probability of t~l given that bidder / has type r. That is,
Notice that I have not defined probability conditional on types of probability zero.
If we are careful, the existence of zero probability types is not an issue.
An ordered list of functions = (Pi, ..., 0, where each P? : 7]? ~> [0, 1] is the reduced form of the auction = (p\,..., p^), if for each bidder / and each type Tj,
That is, Pi ( ) is a bidder's expected probability of winning given his own type is for types with positive probability. If the probability is zero, no restriction is placed on Pi ( ) (other than 0 < /( ) ^ 1, which is implied by Pj : 7/ -? [0, 1]). If is the reduced form of some auction /?, we may also say that is implementable. Maskin and Riley (1984) showed that using the reduced form of an auction (along with the self-selection constraints) leads to a tractable analytic problem for solving the expected revenue maximization problem. It is therefore highly desir able to find a simple criterion for whether or not is a reduced form of some auction p. Matthews (1984) conjectured that the only restriction on for implementability was the necessary condition that the probability that the "winner" had a type in the a subset A could not exceed the probability that there was a bidder with type in A (the MRM condition). Ma skin and Riley (1984, Theorem 7) proved something like this result for increasing step functions on the unit interval. Their proof is long, tedious, and unintuitive. Matthews extended their result to general increasing functions on the unit interval, and conjectured this form of the theorem. Border (1991) proved the conjecture for general abstract measure spaces of types, which need not have an order, so the notion of increasing need not be defined. All these papers rely heavily on symmetry and the latter papers use topological and/or functional analytic techniques and are mildly opaque.
However when is a finite set (ordered or not), is a reduced form if the finite system (F)-(R) of linear inequalities in has a nonnegative solution. By the Theorem of the Alternative, if this system has no nonnegative solution, then its dual system possesses a solution. The proof of sufficiency thus reduces to showing that the existence of a solution to the dual implies that the MRM condition must be violated. Given this insight, the proof practically writes itself. In this framework, the general result. Theorem 3 below, is easier to prove than the symmetric case, which is presented in Theorem 1. The main problem with carrying out this program of proof in i.i.d. environments with symmetric auctions is notational. The natural system of inequalities together with the symmetry conditions on are unwieldy. It is actually simpler to recognize that for a symmetric auction, only a bidder's own type and the distribution of the other bidders' types matters, and to rewrite the problem in these terms.
Section 2 deals with i.i.d. environments and symmetric auctions. Section 3 deals with the general case. An appendix states the particular variant of the Theorem of the Alternative that is used. For the remainder of this section, I shall also abuse notation and identify the set of types with the set integers {1,..., T}. That is, denotes both the number of types and the set of types, r = {i,...,n.
You should not get confused.
Reformulation in terms of censuses
For i.i.d. environments with symmetric auctions, all that matters to bidder / about a profile is his own type and the number of other bidders of each type. Let us call the information about the number of bidders of each type a census. Formally, a census is a nonnegative integer-valued measure on 7, which we can think of as an element of V = 7, where = {(), 1,2,...} is the set of natural numbers including 0. Symmetry guarantees that this is well defined. We can recover = p\ from P)(t) =r(tx\K(t2,...JN)).
We can express the feasibility condition F on in terms of r as follows. L be derived from t by interchanging t\ and t?. Then ( ) = K(tf) and Pi(t) = pi(t') = r(t\;K(tr) = r(t?* ( ) //). 
where 8 is the Kronecker symbol, 8aj} = 1 if a = b and is zero otherwise.
7 The dual system
Assume now that is not a reduced form, that is, assume that the system (4) has no nonnegative solution. Then from the Theorem of the Alternative (see Lemma 1 in the Appendix), the dual system has a solution. The dual system has variables = ( ) ? * (unrestricted signs) and nonnegative variables u = (wm)wepv, and consists of: c{d) -^ SmMTmTum ^ 0. V(t; d) VN~\ (5) aeT* meVN and ( )-um >0, (6) and the nonnegativity condition u ^ 0. Now equation (5) (5) reduces to 0 ^ (dT + l)um, which is redundant.
Properties of the dual solution
The first thing to note is that if the dual system has a solution (Z, u), then b increasing u if needed, there is a solution with ^ 0 for every *. To see this just note that if < 0, then setting = 0 only strengthens inequalitie (6) , and the nonnegativity of u makes (5 ) 
where again 8 is the Kronecker symbol, 8aj7 = 1, if a = h and is zero otherwise.
Since this system has no solution, then by the Theorem of the Alternative (Lemma 1 in the Appendix) the dual system must have a solution. The dual vari ables are /. > where (/, ) e * and us > 0, s e T. The dual system is Z}jj?j(t-'j\tj) -ut ^ 0 V0\ t) : 0\ ?j) *,
/, /( )? ^ >a ) for each ( j, tj) T*, so it follows that:
For all e and all ? = 1,..., tik = * r E\ U--UEk.
That is, E],..., is a partition of [t : ut > 0}.
Then (14)- (16) 
